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Abstract 
Background. In Life-Cycle Assessment (LCA), decision makers 
are often faced with tradeoffs between current and future im- 
pacts. One typical example is waste incineration, where imme- 
diate emissions to the air from the incineration process have to 
be weighted against future emissions of slag landfills. Long-term 
impacts are either completely taken into account or they are 
entirely disregarded incase of a temporal cut-off. Temporal cut- 
offs are a special case of discounting. 
Objective. In this paper, discounting is defined as valuing dam- 
ages differently at different points of time using a positive or 
negative discount rate. Apart from temporal cut-offs, discount- 
ing has rarely been applied in LCA so far. It is the goal of this 
paper to discuss the concept of discounting and its applicability 
in the context of LCA. 
Methods. For this purpose, we first review the arguments for 
discounting and its principles in economic sciences. Discount- 
ing in economics can be motivated by pure time preference, pro- 
ductivity of capital, diminishing marginal utility of consump- 
tion, and uncertainties. The nominal discount rate additionally 
includes changes in the price level. These arguments and their 
justification are discussed in the context of environmental im- 
pacts harming future generations. 
Results and Discussion. It is concluded that discounting across 
generations because of pure time preference contradicts funda- 
mental ethical values and should therefore not be applied in 
LCA. However, it has to be acknowledged that in practice deci- 
sion makers often use positive discount rates because of pure 
time preference - either because they might profit from impos- 
ing environmental damage on others instead of themselves or 
because people in the far future are not of immediate concern to 
them. Discounting because of the productivity of capital assumes 
a relationship between monetary values and environmental im- 
pact. If such a relationship is accepted, discounting could be 
applied. However, future generations should be compensated 
for the environmental damage. It is likely that they would de- 
mand a higher compensation if the real per capita income in- 
creases. As both the compensation and the discount rate are 
related to economic growth, the overall discount rate might be 
close to zero. It is shown that the overall discount rate might 
even be negative considering that the required compensation 
could increase (even to infinite) if natural assets remain scarce, 
whereas the utility of consumption diminishes with increasing 
income. Uncertainties could justify both positive and negative 
discount rates. Since the relationship between uncertainties and 
the magnitude of damage is generally not exponential, we rec- 
ommend to model changes in the magnitude of damage in sce- 
nario analysis instead of considering it in discounting (which 
requires an exponential function of time in the case of a con- 
stant discount rate). We investigated the influence of discount- 
ing in a case study of heavy metal emissions from slag landfills. 
It could be shown that even small discount rates of less than 1% 
lead to a significant reduction of the impact score, whereas nega- 
tive discount rates inflate the results. 
Conclusions and Recommendations. Discounting isonly appli- 
cable when temporally differentiated data is available. In some 
cases, such a temporal differentiation is necessary to take sound 
decisions, especially when long emission periods are involved. 
An example is the disposal of nuclear or heavy metal-contain- 
ing waste. In these cases, the results might completely depend 
on the discount rate. This paper helps to structure arguments 
and thus to support the decision about whether or not discount- 
ing should be applied in an LCA. 
Keywords: Discounting; discount rate; externalities; landfill; 
LCA; LCIA; long-term impacts; monetarization; scenario; time 
dependency; time preference; values; weighting 
Introduction 
It has long been recognized that certain environmental deci- 
sions involve tradeoffs between present and future impacts. 
Such tradeoffs raise issues of (intergenerational) fairness and 
equity that are ethical in nature. Life-Qycle Assessment (LCA) 
involves many of such temporal issues [1]. For instance, con- 
struction materials are often 'stored' in buildings for many 
decades before they are recycled or disposed of [2]. It is un- 
certain, which disposal technologies will be used for these 
materials in the future. Information about the composition 
of materials might be lost in the course of the years, which 
makes an adequate treatment more difficult. The use of some 
of these materials or substances with a high impact or risk 
potential might have even been forbidden or limited mean- 
while (e.g. CFC), but they remain to be released to the envi- 
ronment for long times. Resources are bound in the build- 
ing that cannot be used for other purposes. While the initial 
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use of resources i usually considered in LCA, the time pe- 
riod of use is neglected [2]. Moreover, when materials are 
recycled, impacts are generally not allocated to the second- 
ary product in LCA. Finally, some of the emissions, e.g. from 
land-filling construction residues, occur in the far future and 
it is unclear how they should be assessed. 
In general, LCA makes no explicit differentiation between 
emissions (and, ultimately, impacts and damages) at differ- 
ent points in time. For instance, whether an emission con- 
tributes to ozone depletion today or in 200 years is treated 
equally in LCA. Nevertheless, there are some forms of im- 
plicit discounting that are common practice, e.g. temporal 
system boundaries [3]. Temporal cut-offs are a special case 
of discounting with a discount rate of zero for the time ho- 
rizon considered and of infinity thereafter. Such temporal 
system boundaries are often proposed for landfill emissions 
[4,5]. Similarly, the distinction between short-term emissions 
(-<100 years) and long-term emissions (>100 years) [6,7] 
implies a different valuation for the two periods. In the im- 
pact assessment phase, the choice of several models is re- 
lated to time. For instance, different ime horizons can be 
chosen for the global warming effect, typically 20, 100, and 
500 years. Depending on this choice, the global warming 
potential of a pollutant may differ considerably. Huijbregts 
et al. [8] found that metal toxicity potentials differed up to 
6.5 orders of magnitude depending on the time horizon cho- 
sen in the fate model. These large differences are due to long 
residence times and slow removal pathways from the soil 
and marine water/sediment compartments. To reduce the 
importance of long-term emissions, several methods intro- 
duced fictitious 'removal rates' or 'degradation rates' for 
metals in the fate modeling, (another example of implicit 
discounting) [9,10]. Despite these examples, and in contrast 
to other projects uch as the Impact Pathway Method of the 
ExternE Project a [12], explicit discounting has rarely been 
applied in LCA (exceptions are [13,14]). Since LCA is a value- 
based decision support ool, it needs to address time-prefer- 
ences if they are relevant in the context of future environ- 
mental damages. There are some applications such as waste 
incineration, where tradeoffs between impacts in the present 
and in the future have to be made. For instance, new ther- 
mal waste treatment technologies prevent long-term emis- 
sions at the cost of a higher energy use with more immedi- 
ate impacts. These issues demand a thorough discussion of 
whether impacts at different points in time should be 
weighted alike and, therefore, whether discounting (includ- 
ing temporal system boundaries) hould be applied in LCA. 
In this paper, we briefly introduce the economical back- 
ground of discounting (Section 1). Emphasis is placed on 
motivating the use of discounting in LCA (Section 2) and on 
illustrating the consequences of discounting in a case study 
(Section 3). It is neither the intention of this paper to discuss 
all ethical standpoints involved (see [3] for an overview) nor 
to provide a universal answer of whether or not discounting 
~ Although the Impact Pathway methodology has not been designed for 
LCA purposes, it is very similar and could be part of an LCA [11]. 
should be applied in the context of LCA. An anthropocen- 
tric point of view is adopted throughout the whole paper (as 
is always the case in economic discounting). Furthermore, it 
is assumed that weighting between different environmental 
impacts, as often performed in quantitative LCA, is not per- 
ceived as 'unethical'. Otherwise, weighting environmental 
damages at different points of time is certainly also not ac- 
cepted so that the following discussion would be needless. 
1 The Concept of Discounting: Economical Background 
In the economic sciences, future costs and benefits are usually 
discounted to a present value in order to make them compa- 
rable to current costs and benefits (cost / benefit analysis) [15]. 
There are several reasons for valuing one monetary unit of 
benefit or cost differently at different points of time. For in- 
stance, pure time preferencesOmpatience), th  productivity of 
capital (related to economic growth / decline), and uncer- 
tainty / risk perception are all factors that change valuations 
with time. The way the valuation changes in time is generally 
known as the discount rate. This rate depends on the factors 
just mentioned. Thus, in economics, the Net Present Value 
(NPV) of an investment is calculated as a function of benefits, 
costs, and the discount rate (Equation 1): 
NPV= ~( (B , -C , ) *  ) (1) 
t=O 
Where B represents the benefits, C the costs, r is the dis- 
count rate, and t is a time index. The discount rate of Equa- 
tion 1 is expressed in real terms, net of any changes in the 
price level. To give an example, aEuro invested today at an 
interest rate of 5% will have increased to 11.47 Euros in 50 
years. Conversely, 100 Euros in 50 years would be worth 
(would require investing) 8.72 Euros now. This latter amount 
of money represents he NPV. 
In economics, the choice of the discount rate is controver- 
sially discussed especially when investments in the public 
sector are at stake [16-18] or if the durations considered are 
long. This discussion involves the question whether the pri- 
vate or the social discount rate should be taken. The private 
discount rate can be observed on the financial markets; for 
instance, a typical value would be between 5 and 7% per 
year in the European Union [12]. Many companies, how- 
ever, calculate with private discount rates greater than 10 %. 
The social discount rate can be defined as the interest rate at 
which society is willing to lend money for public projects 
[15] (Equation 2): 
r = rpref +rl*rgro (2) 
Where rpref is the pure rate of time preference (accounting for 
impatience), rgo rate of economic growth (growth of the Gross 
National Product, GNP), and "q the negative of the elasticity 
of the marginal utility of consumption. The marginal utility of 
consumption decreases with increasing income. For a family 
living at the poverty level, for instance, an additional Euro 
income is assumed to have a higher utility than for a million- 
aire. The elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption is 
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negative, and rl therefore has a positive value ('q is generally 
given as between 1and 3 [15,18,19]). The component TI * r~ro 
thus accounts for the idea that societies will probably be richer 
in the future (assuming economic growth) and that we should 
attach less weight o their gains. 
In an ideal economy the social and private discount rate of 
the financial market should be the same [15,18]. However, 
the social discount rate is usually smaller than the private 
discount rate. Some of the reasons are that private compa- 
nies have to pay taxes for their benefits and that public 
projects are thought o be less risky than private projects 
[15]. Note that the discount rate is not necessarily constant, 
although it is generally assumed to be so in practice. In fact, 
if future interest could be accurately predicted, cost-benefit 
theory would then recommend the use of these differing rates 
[20]. However, only few economic models calculate with 
non-constant discount rates [21]. 
2 Discounting and the Environment: Motivations and 
Objections 
This section discusses a possible transfer of the discounting 
principle to environmental projects and LCA. As mentioned 
above, discounting in economics takes into consideration: 
1. Changes in the price level (only nominal discount rate); 
2. Pure time preference; 
3. Productivity of capital and diminishing marginal utility 
of consumption; 
4. Uncertainties. 
These four arguments for discounting will be discussed one 
by one in Sections 2.1 to 2.4. First, the authors will gener- 
ally discuss the justification of these motivations in the con- 
text of LCA. In a second step, we suggest possible conse- 
quences for the discount rate. In the present study, the 
'European' perspective of LCA is adopted, which permits 
the aggregation of environmental impacts [22] and thereby 
allows comparing damages of different nature. 
2.1 Changes in the magnitude of impact 
In economics, the nominal discount rate includes changes in 
the price level. With respect o LCIA, changes in the envi- 
ronment might lead to a change in value of the unit measur- 
ing the damage (monetary or not). For instance, an accumu- 
lation of heavy metals in the environment might trigger a 
change in the damage produced by an additional unit of 
emission. If these changes have not been considered in an 
earlier phase of the impact assessment, the measuring unit is 
subject o inflation or deflation, because it no longer corre- 
sponds to the same magnitude of damage. A 'nominal' dis- 
count rate would include such changes in the magnitude of 
damage. Thus, using a 'real' discount rate z requires consid- 
ering changes in damage magnitude in the impact assess- 
ment prior to discounting. 
The modeling of changes in the magnitude of impact as a 
function of space and time appears to be widely accepted. 
Potting et al. [25] suggest different site-dependent acidifica- 
tion factors for 44 regions in Europe for the years 1990 and 
2010. Similarly, the ISO-norms state with respect o nor- 
malization that the selection of the reference system should 
consider the consistency of the spatial and temporal scales of 
the environmental mechanisms and the reference value [26]. 
The magnitude of an impact might change, for instance, as a 
consequence of a changing background concentration of a 
pollutant or pollutant mix in the environment (Table 1). The 
relation between concentrations i  the environment and dam- 
2 Rabl [24] applied a similar concept to calculate an 'effective discount rate' 
in the case of nuclear energy. He considered a change in the magnitude 
of damage by considering improvement of medical treatment and the 
increasing number of cancer cases due to increases in life expectancy. 
He assumes that the number of cancer cases and medical advances 
evolve exponentially. Based on past data (reduction of fatalities per case 
of cancer in 100 years and increase in cancer rate by 18.9% in 23 years), 
he concludes that the real discount rate should be close to zero [24]. 
Table 1: Examples illustrating ~ossible motivations for discounting in LCA 
1. Changes in the The background concentration of pollutants in the environment changes as a function of time. Assuming non-linear 
magnitude of damage concentration-effect-curves, the magnitude of impact would change as well. Consequently, the future impact of an 
emission would be different han its current impact. 
2. Pure time preference Two technologies release the same amount of an emission, but at different points in time. Technology A releases 
this emission today, technology B in 100 years. In both cases, this emission will have the same impact on the 
environment. Discounting because of pure time preference would mean that technology B would be preferred to 
technology A, in spite of the equivalence in impact. 
3. Productivity of capital 9 Prevention costs: Imagine a landfill that does not release major emissions in the first 200 years and from which 
4. Uncertainties 
heavy metals could be extracted and recycled today or in 200 years for the same price of 1 million Euros (thus 
preventing emissions). Assuming a discount rate of 2.3% (average growth in Switzerland from 1910-1967 
[23]), it would be sufficient o invest 11,000 Euros on the capital market today in order to finance the project in 
200 years. 
Damage compensation: Assume that environmental damages can be compensated financially. Using the 
above example, it would be sufficient to invest 11,000 Euros on the capital market in order to pay a 
compensation of 1 million Euros in 200 years. 
9 A toxic emission does not have its impact because humankind (the environment, the earth) does not exist any 
more (reasoning for a positive discount rate). 
9 The population number increases and thereby the number of effected people (reasoning for a negative 
discount rate). 
9 A technology will be developed to prevent all damages (reasoning for a positive discount rate). 
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Damage, 
effect 
f 
NOEC log dose, concentration 
Fig. 1 : Sigmoid concentration / effect or damage curve [28] (NOEC: No- 
Observed Effect Concentration). The effect depends on the dose (in gen- 
eral, the dose is related to the concentration of a pollutant or pollutant mix 
in the environment). Aggregating LCIA methods use the slopes of the dam- 
age curves as weighting factors 
age is often illustrated inconcentration-effect or damage curves. 
These curves generally have a sigmoid shape (Fig. 1). 
If the background contamination level changes, the position 
on the damage curve and the slope will change as well. Ag- 
gregating LCIA methods use these slopes as weighting fac- 
tors. Therefore, it is important to know the present and fu- 
ture positions on the damage curves in order to estimate the 
potential impact or damage of the system under study. 
The magnitude of damage might also change due to other 
factors as a function of site and time. Some of those character- 
istics, to mention afew, are a changing number or distribution 
of the human population (thereby in / decreasing the number 
of affected people), a changing sensitivity of ecosystems, an 
application of remediation technologies in the future, and a 
change in climatic onditions. Steen [27], however, argues that 
abatement measures should not be considered inLCA because 
one of the purposes of LCA is to encourage t chnology devel- 
opment (which will not be done if this is already taken into 
account in the damage assessment). 
In theory, future changes in the magnitude ofdamages could 
be considered in the discount rate. However, it seems more 
reasonable to model such changes in damage in the impact 
assessment phase prior to discounting. One reason is that 
the magnitude of damage isusually not an exponential func- 
tion of time (an exponential relationship is required when 
discounting with a constant rate, see Equation 1). One way 
to consider future changes in the magnitude of damage is 
with a scenario analysis (Section 3). 
2.2 Discounting Environmental Damages because of Pure 
Time Preference 
In discounting, an important question to be addressed is
whether an identical environmental damage can be worth 
less in the future than today. We will assume that the dam- 
age occurs with absolute certainty and that the magnitude 
of damage is always the same (see example in Table 1). 
It is well known that, in actual decision making, people of- 
ten tend to prefer a present utility to a future utility. Linestone 
[29] claims that most people have a short planning horizon 
and that they are really concerned only with their immedi- 
ate neighborhood in space and time. Many other authors 
and empirical evidence confirm this view (e.g. [30-33]). Peo- 
ple differentiate peoples according to several kinds of dis- 
tance or proximity (geographical, cultural, and temporal). 
Deciding about whether one cares more about people in the 
far future than about current people is a little like deciding 
whether one cares more about people on one continent han 
on another, ... or about those with whom one shares history 
and culture more than those who do not . . . .  These prefer- 
ences show up in charitable giving, in foreign aid, in immi- 
gration policy, and in military intervention [33]. Behavioral 
research suggests hat many people have a positive discount 
rate, but that they attach less importance to a difference 
between two times the further into the future these times 
are moved. Therefore, the discount rate would be decreas- 
ing as a function of time (for quotes ee [20]). Discounting 
because of pure time preference is commonly accepted 
(though sometimes called irrational), when short-term hori- 
zons are concerned. However, in decisions affecting future 
generations it is ethically questionable. 
There seems to be wide agreement among ethicists that the 
welfare of future generations should be a concern to us and 
that all members of all generations deserve qual treatment 
including those not yet born. Only an equal treatment ofall 
people without heir temporal position is accepted as mor- 
ally correct (e.g., [17,18,31,34-36] and the herein quoted 
authors). A pure time preference with a positive value im- 
plies that future people are not moral objects with equal 
rights as current people [3]. If LCA wants to meet com- 
monly accepted ethical standards, environmental impact 
harming future generations cannot be subjected to discount- 
ing because of pure time preference. According to this line 
of thinking, we propose setting the pure rate of time prefer- 
ence (rpref in Equation 2) to zero. However, it has to be ac- 
knowledged that timing neutrality is at variance with pref- 
erences of most current people [20]. Therefore, in practice, 
decision-makers often have and use a pure rate of time pref- 
erence greater than zero. 
2.3 Discounting because of capital productivity and 
diminishing marginal utility of consumption 
Discounting because of capital productivity assumes a rela- 
tionship between environmental damage and economic val- 
ues. Therefore, we will first discuss if and how monetary 
equivalents can be found for environmental damage and what 
objections exist o the monetarization approach. Afterwards, 
discounting ofthe monetary equivalent ofenvironmental dam- 
age will be discussed assuming that monetarization is accepted. 
2.3.1 Monetary valuation of environmental damages 
In economics, especially in cost-benefit analysis, it is com- 
mon practice (though also controversial) to assign prices to 
external benefits and costs [15]. These prices are called 
IntJ LCA8 (1) 2003 11 
Discounting and the Environment LCA Methodology with Case Study 
shadow prices. In environmental economics it is often sug- 
gested that a price be assigned to natural assets via taxes [37] 
or by distributing a limited amount of pollution rights so that 
the stock market decides upon the price [38]. The objective is
to correct limitations of the market, where nature is not per- 
ceived as a scarce resource and, as a consequence, not ad- 
equately considered in policy and liability decisions [39]. For 
instance, a coal-fired power plant can have negative health 
effects, such as asthma, on the population i  the neighborhood. 
The market does not provide a signal that the plant ought o 
control its air emissions [40]. Assigning a monetary value to 
these health effects is one approach to put these xternal costs 
on par with other costs and to force the power plant to con- 
sider them (polluter-pays-principle). 
However, the monetarization f human lives or natural as- 
sets is often perceived as unethical (see Leist [31] and refer- 
ences cited therein). MacLean [36] calls it morally repug- 
nant if (human) life is seen as being exchangeable with other 
utilities. Other authors writing on ethics and especially on 
economics [14,15,31] agree that natural assets, in fact, do 
not have a price - but, first, there would probably be a will- 
ingness to pay for them if a market existed, and, second, 
decisions often require a ranking of preferences between in- 
compatible choices. Indeed, there are many examples where 
an aggregation ofdifferent types of damage iscommon prac- 
tice, e.g. liability law or extra payments for high-risk jobs 
[15]. Compensation i liability cases is usually accepted by 
the involved parties [41]. Also many methods for Life-Cycle 
Impact Assessment (LCIA) aggregate damages of different 
nature and therefore suggest he possibility of tradeoffs 
[10,27,42--44]. Fully aggregating methods either use a ficti- 
tious unit such as 'points' for measuring an environmental 
impact [10,42--44] or monetary units [27,45-47]. For instance, 
the external costs of electricity supply in the US were esti- 
mated with the help of LCA [40,48]. Even if a non- 
monetarizing method is applied, financial investments are of- 
ten compared to the environmental benefits (measured, for 
instance, in 'points'). Meier [49] defines eco-efficiency asthe 
quotient of the net ecological benefit (LCA result) and the net 
present value of the investment (Equation 1). Other authors 
propose to directly convert impact quantified by LCA to mon- 
etary units [13,48,50]. Therefore, a relation between LCA re- 
sults and monetary units appears to exist. 
The total economic value is composed of the use value, the 
option value (value for having an option to use something 
in the future), and the existence value (intrinsic value) [51]. 
There are various techniques for estimating these external 
costs, among others market prices (e.g. of crops which can- 
not grow any more due to an emission), hedonic prices (e.g. 
the decrease of house prices as a consequence of increasing 
noise), travel costs (to visit an area), and the contingent valu- 
ation method (surveys of the 'Willingness To Accept' (WTA) 
or the 'Willingness To Pay' (WTP) of people to prevent or 
accept adamage 3,e.g. a reduction in mortality risk) [39,40, 
3 From a moral perspective, WTA is more suitable than WTP for valuing 
damages to natural assets (public goods), because this implies that the 
property rights are held by people (in the present and in the future) [31]. 
52-56]. These techniques have frequently been used in policy- 
making [12,40,52-54,57] and they have widely been dis- 
cussed in the environmental literature (more than 2,000 
papers [54]). However, they have some major shortcomings 
[36,40,55,58]: One drawback of the WTP approach is that 
the shadow prices depend on the initial endowments ofpeo- 
ple without considering the distribution of economic oppor- 
tunities [21] ('one dollar one vote'). Unless cost~benefit analy- 
sis is accompanied by criteria that speak to distributional 
concerns, there is some danger in using it to identify 'opti- 
mal' ... policies [21]. Another limitation is that it is difficult 
to associate verbal responses to subsequent behavior. Fur- 
thermore, it is hardly possible to estimate a proper price for 
pervasive and complex environmental problems uch as the 
greenhouse effect [59,60]. Finally, there is a risk that such 
price estimations do not include the nonquantifiable element 
(existence value) such as the value of a species for its own 
sake [59]. These shortcomings show that monetarization 
should be applied with caution [59]. Nevertheless, if applied 
in an adequate context, monetarization techniques may be 
powerful instruments for the economic and environmental 
assessment of policy options. 
From this discussion, we have concluded that there are good 
reasons and techniques for a monetarization f environmen- 
tal damages. However, there are ethical objections towards 
assigning aprice to human life and natural assets presuming 
exchangeability with marketed goods. Moreover, existing 
procedures for assigning prices to non-marketed assets are 
controversial. The following section discusses discounting 
under the conditions that it is accepted to assign monetary 
values to environmental damages and that a positive view is 
held towards the market economy. 
2.3.2 Discounting the monetary value of environmental damage 
One reason for discounting in economics i that capital can 
usually be invested so that it grows in the future. Put in 
other words, there is a possibility that reducing current con- 
sumption and investing the saved resources can increase fu- 
ture consumption. For instance, assume that there are two 
persons A and B that have the same amount of money avail- 
able for investment. A puts the money into a saving box and 
waits for a year. B invests the money in one sack of corn and 
plants this corn on a field. After paying part of the harvest 
for rent, B obtains two sacks of corn one year later. It is 
obvious that A - though not losing any money - foregoes 
benefit, because he could have doubled his money as well 
instead of merely keeping it. The foregone benefit of A is 
called opportunity cost. Opportunity cost is one reason why 
discounting is a must in economics. Another argument for 
discounting in the context of capital productivity is the di- 
minishing marginal utility of consumption. Economic growth 
(related to income) causes people to attach less weight to 
additional gains and, therefore, discounting isneeded. From 
Equation 2 we deduce that discounting on the basis of capi- 
tal productivity and diminishing marginal utility of consump- 
tion can be done with a positive discount rate in the case of 
economic growth and with a negative rate in the case of 
recession. Therefore, the discount rate depends on the ex- 
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pectations about the development of the world's economy. 
These expectations are very controversial. For instance, 
standard economic analyses assume continuous growth of 
the economy. However, this assumption has been questioned 
substantially in the context of limited natural resources and 
increasing technological risks such as radiation and toxic 
waste [59,60]. 
Concerning environmental issues, it seems odd to discount 
future damage or (dis)utility, as these cannot be stored in a 
fund, and there is no reason to expect such a fund to grow 
[60]. Nevertheless, there are arguments that might justify 
this type of discounting under certain circumstances. As- 
sume, for example, that monetarization is performed on the 
basis of prevention or abatement costs. Using the preven- 
tion cost example of Table 1, it seems logical to say that 
discounting might be justified in this scenario. However, this 
approach as a confidence problem. It is difficult o guaran- 
tee that the money will not be consumed by intermediate 
generations. Moreover, abatement costs do not seem to be 
an adequate measure in an LCA, where damages are valued 
considering the magnitude of impact or political targets 4.The 
two approaches do not seem to match well. On the contrary, 
the willingness to pay (WTP) and the willingness to accept 
(WTA) approaches seem to be applicable for LCA purposes. 
The WTP approach was used for the EPS method [27] and in 
the ExternE project [12]. The valuation of some other LCIA 
methods [10,43,44] is based on panel methods or political 
targets. It seems reasonable to assume that a damage that re- 
ceives a high weight by a panel (or politicians representing the 
people) would also receive ahigh 'price' if the panel would be 
asked to assign monetary values. 
Applying the WTP or WTA approach implies that damages 
can be compensated financially. This is usually assumed in 
cost-benefit analysis. The efficiency criterion of cost-benefit 
analysis is usually interpreted as making changes that help 
some, even at the expense of others, as long as the gainers 
can fully compensate he loosers (Kaldor Hicks criterion) [61]. 
Since the money for compensation of damages occurring in 
the long-term could be invested on the capital market, dis- 
counting could be justified in these cases (see Table 1). The 
problem with this approach is twofold. First, future genera- 
tions cannot be asked whether they agree to such compen- 
sations, the decision has to be made by current generations 
who might be prone to biased ecisions. For irreversible dam- 
ages, no option is left to future generations tochoose between 
the natural asset and the compensation. However, such 
tradeoffs are already practiced in aggregating LCA, where 'ir- 
reversible and reversible damages are measured on the same 
scale (which assumes that tradeoffs are possible). Second, it is 
not certain that the compensation payment will be passed on 
by intermediate g nerations 5 [16]. These ideas can be summa- 
rized as follows: discounting can only be justified if it is be- 
lieved that future generations are adequately compensated and 
that they would be satisfied with such compensation. 
There is one important consequence for the discount rate: If 
the income per capita increases, the willingness to accept an 
environmental damage is likely to do so as well. Since both 
the discount rate and the WTP / WTA are related to economic 
growth, the resulting overall discount rate might therefore be 
close or equal to zero [19,35,63]. It might even lead to the 
situation of a negative discount rate: Assume that the WTA 
for an environmental impact increases over time with the so- 
cial discount rate (the social discount rate reflects ociety's 
relative preferences for consumption i the present and future 
[64]). For illustrative purposes, we set the elasticity of the 
marginal utility of consumption to-2 01 = 2, Equation 2), the 
annual rate of economic growth rgro = annual increase of in- 
come = rate of return on investment = 2.3%, and the rate of 
pure time preference rpref = 0. From here, the WTA of 100 
Euros in year 0 would grow in value to 
100 * (1 +r) t= 100 * (1 +1"1 * rgro)t = 100 * (1.046)t in year t. 
Let us assume that the compensation money can be invested 
at 2.3% (rate of return on investment), so that after t years 
the available amount would be 
100 * (1 + rgro) t = 100 * (1.023) t.
This would lead to a negative overall discount rate of-2.3 %. 
Price [19], using common utility functions, showed that the 
overall discount rate might even go towards negative infin- 
ity when q >1. This scenario is plausible considering that 
constant economic growth over a long period of time would 
lead to a very high income - and perhaps people would in 
fact demand an extremely high compensation for damages 
to natural assets or an increase in mortality risk, because 
the utility of further money would be limited then, whereas 
natural assets remain scarce. Above a certain level of in- 
come a situation might come up in which no monetary com- 
pensation is accepted for any impact o natural assets. These 
arguments lead to the conclusion that discounting because 
of the capital productivity could lead to a discount rate close 
to 0%, even if monetarization f damages and discounting 
of the monetary equivalent isaccepted. However, both posi- 
tive and negative discount rates also seem to be possible. 
4 The prevention cost approach has only rarely been used in LCA, for in- 
stance by Vogtlander & Bijma [46]. These authors assume that all meas- 
ures for prevention will be implemented in the future. However, if this is 
not the case, the prevention cost approach incites us to prevent he emis- 
sions that are most expensive to be prevented (which is questionable 
from an economical as well as from an environmental point of view). Since 
LCA usually has the goal to prevent he most harmful impacts, a weight- 
ing considering the magnitude of potential damage is the common case. 
s The compensations would not need to be saved in a separate fund - it 
could also be 'inherited' in another form. For instance, many economists 
think that the world economy is growing and that the future will be better off 
than the present [61].Therefore, future generations could profit from (and 
be compensated by) greater welfare. However, this expectation presumes 
sustainable economic growth, since environmental destruction holds all 
the potential for eroding the capital stock of future generations [62]. 
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2.4 Discounting because of uncertainties 
Risk or uncertainty about future developments might have 
an influence on the discount rate. According to Pearce & 
Turner [51], the following uncertainties are of relevance: 
9 Uncertainty about he presence of an individual or society 
in the future (in the case of long-term emissions) 
9 Uncertainty about he preferences ofthe individual (or society) 
9 Uncertainty about he existence, magnitude, or quality of 
damage. 
There is no doubt that uncertainties xist, especially if time 
horizons of thousands of years are considered. It is not possi- 
ble to ascertain whether humankind will still exist and what 
preferences it will have (see Table 1). It is also unclear whether 
the predictions of potential environmental impacts are reli- 
able and whether future generations will perceive them as dam- 
age. Finally, a new technology could be developed so that long- 
term damages are eliminated. All these circumstances, if they 
become reality, would call for a positive discount rate, thereby 
reducing the present value of any future environmental dam- 
age. In fact, such arguments are frequently used in practice. 
For instance, the opposition towards the decision of the US 
environmental protection agency (EPA) to consider a 10,000 
year horizon without discounting for nuclear waste disposal 
has been substantial. The criticism was based among other 
things on the idea that the future state of society is uncertain 
and that discounting should therefore be done with a positive 
rate [32]. The question is whether these arguments are strong 
enough to justify discounting. 
There are many ethical objections towards discounting with 
a discount rate greater than zero because of the uncertainty 
of the existence of costs. First, uncertainties can be used to 
justify both positive and negative discount rates [31,34]. For 
instance, the population umber might grow, the popula- 
tion might get more sensitive to environmental pollution, or 
environmental impacts unforeseen today may appear in the 
future, thereby increasing the number of people potentially 
affected. A new remediation technology might be developed, 
but it might also generate new environmental problems. And 
even if such a technology could be developed, this does not 
ethically justify the imposition of risks on the future [34]. 
Just because A is better able to deal with B's problems than 
B is, does not mean that B has the right to impose his prob- 
lems on A [34]. Second, one of the goals of many LCAs is to 
prevent environmental harm by identifying key environmen- 
tal issues and thus stimulate technological development. I f  
we examined scenarios where future technology would solve 
all environmental problems, we would not get the incite- 
ments to develop such technology [27]. Third, uncertainty 
is not an ethical justification for rejecting responsibility for 
future generations [31]. If there is a probability for human- 
kind to exist in the future, and this probability is large [60], 
then current generations automatically have the responsi- 
bility not to harm future generations [31]. Even if the state 
of the future society differs from today's, it is very likely 
that fatalities, illnesses, and injuries will still be perceived as 
damages [19,31]. Ethicists argue that the preferences of cur- 
rent society should serve as proxy of future generations [34]. 
A further argtunent is that discounting because of the uncer- 
tainty of the existence of humankind would encourage a casual 
attitude to the future, which increases the likelihood of dam- 
age to future generations ('self-fulfilling prophecy') [19]. 
From this discussion we conclude that there are severe ob- 
jections to discounting because of (1) uncertainty about the 
presence of a society and (2) about the preference of the 
society. Since uncertainty (3) concerning the existence of cost 
might not grow exponentially asa function of time [12], we 
propose considering this type of uncertainty in the modeling 
of the magnitude of damage (Section 2.1) rather than in the 
'real' discount rate. 
2.5 Conclusions for the Use of Discounting in Environmental 
Assessment Tools 
From the above sections, several conclusions can be drawn: 
9 If done sincerely and transparently it is desirable to consider 
anticipated changes in the magnitude of damage in the nomi- 
nal discount rate or, better, in a prior phase of impact assess- 
ment (thus working with a 'real' discount rate thereafter). 
9 Ethical considerations lead to the conclusion that discount- 
ing because of pure time preference is not acceptable if sev- 
eral generations are involved. Therefore, the term rp, a in 
Equation 2 should be set to zero. 
9 Discounting because of capital productivity might be accepted 
under several conditions. First, it should be possible to ex- 
press the damage in monetary units. Second, it should be 
possible to compensate future generations for the damage. 
Third, there should be a compelling reason to believe that 
they would be satisfied with such compensation. All these 
prerequisites are debatable incase of long-term environmen- 
tal damages. However, even if discounting because of capital 
productivity is accepted, the discount rate might be close to 
zero (positive or negative, the upper limit for any long-term 
discount rate being the rate of economic growth). 
9 Uncertainty about he existence of damage could justify posi- 
tive and negative discount rates. However, it is advisable to 
consider these uncertainties in the modeling of the damage 
magnitude rather than to include it in the real discount rate. 
In the following section, we will apply discounting to the 
future impacts of a slag landfill. We will use different dis- 
count rates to illustrate their influence on the results. 
3 Case Study: Discounting the Impacts of Heavy Metals 
Emsissions from Slag Landfills 
The emissions of Cd 2. and Cu 2§ from a slag landfill to the 
groundwater have been quantified as a function of time with 
the help of a geochemical model [65]. Fig. 2 shows the po- 
tential emissions of Cd 2+ to the groundwater f om a slag 
~-~ 6"10 17 
O ~ 4"10 17 
2"10 "17 \ 
"" 0 \ 
0 4,000 8,000 
Time (years) 
Fig. 2" Emissions of Cd 2§ from a slag landfill as a function of time [65,66]. 
The functional unit is the deposition of 200 g of slag corresponding to the 
incineration of 1 kg of waste of an average Swiss composition 
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landfill. In order to assess the potential impact of these emis- 
sions, the authors have modeled th  consequences of a change 
in the absolute magnitude of damage due to a changing back- 
ground contamination (Section 2.1). For this purpose, we de- 
veloped three different scenarios: Our first scenario Trend 
extrapolates current trends observed in Switzerland and takes 
account of a possible depletion of resources. The second sce- 
nario Free Market is an environmental worst-case scenario 
assuming first an increase and then a constant use of cad- 
mium and copper. Our last scenario New Values assumes a
dramatic reduction of the use of heavy metals. These scenarios 
served to estimate the total pollution of the Swiss groundwater 
with heavy metals. This background contamination asa func- 
tion of time was considered in the weighting of the emissions 
of Fig. 2. We used the Swiss Method of Ecological Scarcity 
[44] in the impact assessment (unit: ecopoints). We chose this 
method in spite of its obsolete character, because it assumes a 
simple (quadratic) relationship between background pollution 
and environmental damage, which facilitates the calculation. 
For a detailed escription of the scenarios and the modeling 
of the background contamination consult [66]. 
The weighted results are presented in Fig. 3. The differences 
between the three scenarios are large when the Method of 
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Fig. 3: LCIA results of Cd 2§ emissions from slag landfills as a function of 
time considering potential changes in the background contamination level. 
The functional unit is the deposition of 200 g of slag corresponding to the 
incineration of 1 kg of waste of an average Swiss composition. The Method 
of Ecological Scarcity [44] was applied in the impact assessment 
Ecological Scarcity is used (note that there would be no dif- 
ference between them if a linear method such as Eco-indica- 
tor 95 [42] had been applied). It can be deduced that the 
development of the background contamination may have a 
strong influence on the magnitude of impact. Therefore, sce- 
nario analysis about changes in damage magnitude may be 
recommendable in problem situations, in which a large share 
of impact occurs in the future and in which non-linear dose- 
response curves can be assumed. 
As recommended in Sections 2.2 to 2.4, we applied discount- 
ing with a slightly positive and slightly negative discount rate 
(-1% _< r _< + 1%). This range of values for the discount rate is 
plausible when, for example, the pure time preference is set to 
zero and when uncertainties are not considered in the discount 
rate. In this case, the value of the discount rate depends on the 
question, whether monetarization is accepted (ifnot then r = 0 %) 
and what assumptions are made about he future development 
of the economy and compensation payments (Section 2.3). For 
illustrative purposes, we also performed the calculations with 
higher eal discount rates of between r = _+ 5% and r = _.* 10%. 
These high discount rates might incorporate uncertainties, ex- 
pectations about economic growth and compensation payments, 
and pure time preference. 
Fig. 4 shows the results for Cd 2§ as a function of time (in 
ecopoints per year and kg waste, left graph) and aggregated 
over time (right graph) assuming a constant background 
contamination of the groundwater at the current pollution 
level in Switzerland. Note the application of a different im- 
pact assessment method would only change the unit of the 
y-axis. The table in Fig. 4 additionally shows the discounted 
results for the three scenarios described above. The impor- 
tance of long-term emissions i reduced considerably if posi- 
tive discount rates are applied. At a discount rate of +5% all 
impacts after about 200 years are reduced to less than 
0.005% compared to the rating without discounting. At a 
discount rate of + 1%, the time horizon considered increases 
to about 1,000 years. The use of negative discount rates 
Fig, 4: LCIA results for Cd 2§ emissions from slag landfills to the groundwater using different discount rates (Method of Ecological Scarcity). The left graph 
displays impact as a function of time (impact per year and kg waste) assuming a constant background contamination. The right graph shows the same 
results aggregated over time.The table below displays the aggregated numerical values in ecopoints concerning static (compare graph above) and variable 
background contamination levels modeled with scenario analysis 
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leads to extremely high results in the case of heavy metal 
emissions from slag landfills due to the long emission pe- 
riod of several thousands of years (Fig. 4). By contrast, he 
overall score is reduced to a value close to zero if a discount 
rate of +1% or higher is used. The higher the discount rate, 
the smaller are the differences between the three scenarios 
assumed (see table in Fig. 4). The exponential nature of dis- 
counting makes it so strong concerning long-term impacts, 
that all other influencing factors appear small. 
If we extend the system boundaries to the impacts from waste 
incineration i cluding the above effects from slag landfills, 
we find that the importance of the process tep 'slag landfill' 
depends completely on the discount rate applied. Without 
discounting, the emissions from the slag landfills have a 
higher impact score than the complete remaining system 
(between 210 and 8,100 ecopoints for Cd 2§ and between 
4,000 and 14 million ecopoints Cu 2§ emissions, Fig. 4). In 
comparison, the remaining system (without slag landfills) 
consisting of the incineration of waste, transport, infrastruc- 
ture, production of ancillary products, and deposition of fil- 
ter ash in subsfirface salt mines would receive a rating of 
between 590 and 1,120 ecopoints per kg waste incinerated 
(in the former case, credit was given for the energy pro- 
duced; reference system: European electricity and heat pro- 
duction from oil). Discounting with a positive rate of, e.g. 
r = +1% makes the impact of the slag emissions mall in 
comparison to the remaining system (between 2 and 6 eco- 
points for Cd 2§ and between 19 and 42 ecopoints for CuZ§ 
Applying negative discount rates leads to an extremely high 
impact of the slag landfills compared to the remaining sys- 
tem. Therefore, the answer to the question which process 
step is the key problem of waste incineration completely 
depends on the discount rate. Similarly, in an LCA compar- 
ing various waste treatment processes, the technology rank- 
ing depended entirely on the discount rate [72]. 
4 Discussion and Conclusions 
One of the prerequisites for discounting is the availability of 
temporally differentiated data. So far, only few attempts have 
been undertaken toprovide such data in the inventory analy- 
sis [65,67]. The provision of emission patterns as a function 
of time is complicated work and, therefore, it is likely that it 
remains restricted to cases where time plays a central role 
(e.g., because of a long emission period). If temporally dif- 
ferentiated data is available, the technical application of dis- 
counting is easy. However, the appropriateness of discount- 
ing is a controversial issue: 
It is often claimed that discounting contradicts sustainability. 
In fact, with sufficiently long time horizons, the value of 
future damages becomes negligible when positive discount 
rates are applied. Discounting has not been integrated into 
the EPS method because it was regarded as being incompat- 
ible With the principle of the Rio Convention that future 
generations have the same right to a good environment as 
current generations [27]. While we agree with this state- 
ment as such and, therefore, suggest setting the pure rate of 
time preference to zero, we oppose to banish the complete 
concept of discounting because of this reasoning. There is a 
strict and a soft interpretation f sustainability [31] and this 
differentiation is crucial with respect to discounting. Accord- 
ing to the strict interpretation ('strong sustainability'), na- 
ture should remain as it is - therefore discounting would be 
prohibited. According to the soft interpretation ('weak 
sustainability'), substitutability between different kinds of 
resources i allowed [68]. Therefore, compensation payments 
could be sufficient, allowing the use of discounting princi- 
ples (Section 2.3). However, it should be noted that these 
principles could result in a neutral, positive, or negative dis- 
count rate depending on the growth rate of income, rate of 
return on investment, elasticity of marginal utility of con- 
sumption, and, in some models [19], on the period of analy- 
sis and size of compensation in relation to income. 
While discounting is generally accepted in intragenerational 
issues, ethicists agree that here should not be intergenerational 
discounting because of pure time preference. Ironically, the 
actual practice in LCA is often exactly the opposite. While 
discounting is often performed at time horizons beyond 100 
years (with an indefinitely high discount rate in the case of a 
temporal cut-off), the emissions or impacts occurring during 
the first 100 years are usually fully considered (with a 0% 
discount rate). This practice is easily understandable, as it has 
empirically been shown that most people are more concerned 
with people they know than with generations ofthe far future 
(Section 2.2). The question, however, is whether LCA wants 
to satisfy such preferences or whether it wants to meet com- 
monly accepted ethical standards, and these two principles 
diverge drastically inthe question of intergenerational discount- 
ing because of pure time preference. In this paper, we argue in 
favor of the 'ethical' solution of treating all safeguard subjects 
equally in (place and) time. However, we realize that actual 
decisions are often shaped by personal preferences for people 
that are closer to us in place and time. The application of 
discounting and the determination f the discount rate will 
remain as to be value choices [3]. 
Hofstetter [69,70] used cultural theory for a definition of 
various archetypes with different value systems and applied 
this concept to the impact assessment of LCA. This approach 
could also be used to structure the discussion of discount- 
ing. In the following, we determine which discount rate 
would fit to the three archetypes (hierarchist, individualist, 
and egalitarian) used in [69,70]. Note that the archetypes 
are only indicative, theoretical constructions. In practice, 
worldviews rely upon combinations ofsuch perspectives and 
develop dynamically [71]. 
The first archetype, the hierarchist, considers future genera- 
tions to be as important as current generations. In our analy- 
sis, we assumed a view similar to the hierarchist perspective 
(as recommended byGoedkoop et al. [10]). This archetype 
does not have a pure time preference and would apply a 
discount rate of close or equal to 0%. However, even such 
small discount rates below 1% might influence the results 
considerably, as our example has shown (Section 3). At a 
rate of 1%, all emissions after 1,000 years become irrel- 
evant. Using a smaller ate of 0.01% increases the time ho- 
rizon considered to about 100,000 years. Negative discount 
rates inflate the results to very high values if long-term time 
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horizons are considered such as in our case study for Cd 2§ 
emissions from landfills. The application of the other arche- 
types would lead to even more extreme results. The indi- 
vidualist believes in the self-regulatory forces of the market 
and in the benign behavior of nature. This archetype might 
assume a scenario similar to our scenario Free Market. An 
individualist would advocate monetarization and discount- 
ing at the private discount rate (note that this perspective 
could be considered unethical concerning intergenerational 
issues). The discount rate of the financial market is typically 
+5% to +7% per year in the European Community [12], 
but private companies use discount rates much higher than 
that. At discount rates of +5% and +20%, all impacts after 
205 and 55 years, respectively, are virtually neglected (less 
than 0.005% compared to the rating without discounting). 
As a consequence, an individualist would see no reason for 
precautionary measures, e.g. implementing new technologies 
that try to reduce the long-term emissions. The egalitarian 
assigns more weight o the future than to the present. He pre- 
fers a preventive management that reflects the precautionary 
principle [70]. An egalitarian would prefer our scenario New 
Values (although e might expect a more pessimistic develop- 
ment) and would apply a zero or even a negative discount 
rate. This application of a negative discount rate would lead 
to an extremely high damage ven with respect o the envi- 
ronmentally positive scenario f New Values. Therefore, an 
egalitarian would consider current incineration technologies 
environmentally very harmful due to the long-term emissions 
of slag landfills (Section 3). However, applying a negative dis- 
count rate, he would even think worse of technologies used 
for vitrifying the slag and, therefore, prolonging the emission 
period. Recovering the heavy metals would be the only ac- 
cepted way of waste treatment in this case. 
While this paper can provide some assistance for deciding upon 
the discount rate, the ultimate choice concerning the discount 
rate remains a value-laden question [3]. However, it can be 
stated that the long-term discount rate should be close or equal 
to zero if LCA wants to meet common ethical standards. In 
our opinion, it is advisable to perform a sensitivity analysis 
when future environmental impacts are involved. Concerning 
long-term effects, the sensitivity analysis should consider at 
least three different discount rates: a zero rate as well as a 
slightly positive and negative rate. If the results are sensitive to 
the choice of the discount rate such as in the case study pre- 
sented in this paper, a thorough reasoning should be given, 
why a certain discount rate was chosen. 
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